We establish a generic result concerning order independence of a dominance relation on finite games. It allows us to draw conclusions about order independence of various dominance relations in a direct and simple way.
Introduction
In the literature on strategic games several dominance relations have been considered and for various of them order independence was established. Just to mention two well-known results. In Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] order independence of strict dominance by a pure strategy in finite games was established. In turn, in Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] order independence of strict dominance by a mixed strategy was proved.
A number of other order independence results have been proved. In Apt [2004] we provided a uniform exposition based on so-called abstract reduction systems, notably Newman's Lemma, and established some new order independence results. However, for each considered dominance relation some supplementary lemmas were needed.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a generic order independence result for finite games that allows us to prove order independence of each relevant dominance relation in a direct and simple way. The exposition still relies on Newman's Lemma, but is now directly linked with the dominance relations through a crucial notion of hereditarity. To check for order independence it suffices to show that the dominance relation is hereditary, a simple condition referring to a single reduction step. We show that in each case this is straightforward. In the conclusions we clarify what makes this approach simpler than the ones used in the literature.
Dominance relations
We assume the customary notions of a strategic game, of strict dominance and weak dominance by a pure, respectively mixed strategy, see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] . We also use the standard notation. In particular, ∆S is the set of probabilities over the finite non-empty set S and for a joint strategy s, s i is the strategy of player i and s −i is the joint strategy of the opponents of player i. All considered games are assumed to be finite.
We assume an initial (finite) strategic game
where G i is a non-empty set of strategies of player i and p i his payoff function. Given non-empty sets of strategies R 1 , . . . , R n such that for all i, R i ⊆ G i we say that R := (R 1 , . . . , R n , p 1 , . . . , p n ) is a restriction (of G). Here of course we view each p i as a function on the subset
In what follows, given a restriction R we denote by R i the set of strategies of player i in R. Further, given two restrictions R and R ′ we write R ′ ⊆ R when for all i, R ′ i ⊆ R i . When reasoning about never best responses we want to carry out the argument for a number of alternatives in a uniform way. To this end by a set of beliefs of player i in a restriction R we mean one of the following sets
i.e., a belief is a joint pure strategy of the opponents,
i.e., a belief is a joint mixed strategy of the opponents, (iii) B i := ∆R −i , i.e., a belief is a probability distribution over the set of joint pure strategies of the opponents (so called correlated mixed strategy ).
In the second and third case the payoff function p i is extended in a standard way to the expected payoff function p i :
Consider now a restriction R := (R 1 , . . ., R n , p 1 , . . ., p n ) with for each player i a set of beliefs B i (R). We say then that a strategy s i in R is a never best response if
By a dominance relation D we mean a function that assigns to each restriction
To avoid unnecessary complications we assume that for each restriction R and player i the set of his D-undominated strategies in R is non-empty, i.e., that for each i, R i \ D R = ∅. This natural assumption is satisfied by all considered dominance relations.
Given two restrictions R and
An outcome of an iteration of → D starting in a game G is a restriction R that can be reached from G using → D in finitely many steps and such that for no
We call a dominance relation D
• order independent if for all initial games G all iterations of → D starting in G yield the same final outcome,
• hereditary if for all initial games G, all restrictions R and
• monotonic if for all initial games G, all restrictions R and R ′ such that R ′ ⊆ R and a strategy
Clearly every monotonic dominance relation is hereditary, but the converse does not need to hold.
Proofs of order independence
We shall establish the following result.
Theorem 1 Every hereditary dominance relation D is order independent.
We relegate the proof in the appendix. This theorem can be used to prove in a straightforward way order independence of various dominance relations. We illustrate it now by means of various examples.
Strict dominance
Recall that a strategy s i is strictly dominated in a restriction (R 1 , . . ., R n , p 1 , . . ., p n ) if for some strategy s
. Denote the reduction relation corresponding to strict dominance by a pure strategy by → S . To see that strict dominance by a pure strategy is hereditary suppose that R → S R ′ and that a strategy s i in R ′ is strictly dominated in R. The initial game is finite, so there exists in R a strategy s ′ i that strictly dominates s i in R and is not strictly dominated in R. Then s ′ i is not eliminated in the step R → S R ′ and hence is a strategy in R ′ . But R ′ ⊆ R, so s ′ i also strictly dominates s i in R ′ . In contrast, strict dominance is not monotonic for the simple reason that no strategy is strictly dominated in a game in which each player has exactly one strategy. Order independence of strict dominance for finite games was originally proved in Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] , by relying on the notion of monotonicity (called there hereditarity) used for binary dominance relations. This approach works since a slightly different reduction relation is used there, according to which every eliminated strategy is strictly dominated in the original restriction by a strategy that is not eliminated. It is straightforward to check that this reduction relation coincides with → S .
Global strict dominance
We say that a strategy s i is globally strictly dominated in a restriction (R 1 , . . ., R n , p 1 , . . ., p n ) if for some strategy s
This notion of dominance was originally considered in Milgrom and Roberts [1990 , pages 1264 -1265 . Its order independence for finite games is a consequence of a more general result proved in Ritzberger [2002, pages 200-201] and also Chen, Long and Luo [2007] , where this dominance relation was analyzed for arbitrary games.
Global strict dominance is clearly monotonic, so it is hereditary.
Never best response
Suppose that each player i in the initial game G has a set of beliefs B i . Then in each restriction R we choose the corresponding set of beliefs B i (R) of player i. For instance, if
Note that if R ′ ⊆ R, then we can identify Π j =i ∆R ′ j with a subset of Π j =i ∆R j and ∆R ′ −i with a subset of ∆R −i . So we can assume that
To prove that being a never best response is a hereditary dominance relation consider the corresponding reduction relation between restrictions that we denote by → N . Suppose that R → N R ′ and that a strategy s i in R ′ is a never best response in R. Assume by contradiction that for some µ i ∈ B i (R ′ ), s i is a best response to µ i in R ′ , i.e.,
is not eliminated in the step R → N R ′ and hence is a strategy in R ′ . But by the choice of s i and s
Order independence of iterated elimination of never best responses was originally proved in Apt [2005] by comparing it with the iterated elimination of global never best responses, a notion we discuss next.
Global never best response
Suppose again that each player i in the initial game G has a set of beliefs B i . Choose in each restriction R the corresponding set of beliefs B i (R) of player i.
We say that a strategy s i in a restriction R is a global never best response if
. So in defining a global never best response we compare the given strategy with all strategies in the initial game and not the current restriction. Note that iterated elimination of global never best responses, when performed 'at full speed' yields the set of rationalizable strategies as defined in Bernheim [1984] .
The property of being a global never best response is clearly monotonic, so it is hereditary. Order independence of this dominance relation was originally proved in Apt [2005] for arbitrary, so possibly infinite, games.
Strict dominance by a mixed strategy
Denote the corresponding reduction relation between restrictions by → SM . Given two mixed strategies m i , m Lemma 1 (Persistence) Assume that R → SM R ′ and that a strategy s i in R is strictly dominated in R by a mixed strategy from R. Then s i is strictly dominated in R by a mixed strategy from R ′ .
Proof. We shall use the following obvious properties of strict dominance by a mixed strategy in a given restriction: 
Hereditarity of → SM is now an immediate consequence of the Persistence Lemma 1. Indeed, suppose that R → SM R ′ and that s i ∈ R ′ i is strictly dominated in R by a mixed strategy in R. By the Persistence Lemma 1 s i is strictly dominated in R by a mixed strategy in R ′ . So s i is also strictly dominated in R ′ by a mixed strategy in R ′ . The proof of order independence of strict dominance by a mixed strategy due to Osborne and Rubinstein [1994, pages 61-62] relied on the existence of Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games.
Global strict dominance by a mixed strategy
We say that a strategy s i is globally strictly dominated by a mixed strategy in a restriction (R 1 , . . ., R n , p 1 , . . ., p n ) if for some mixed strategy m
This notion of dominance was studied in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2006] (it is their operator Φ) and in Apt [2007] . It is obviously monotonic and hence hereditary.
The proof of order independence of this relation is implicit in Apt [2007] . Dominance relations are viewed there as operators on the set of all restrictions. Its Theorem 1 states that monotonic operators are order independent. Monotonicity property of the operator corresponding to global strict dominance by a mixed strategy is noted there in Section 10.
Inherent dominance
Consider a restriction (R 1 , . . ., R n , p 1 , . . ., p n ). We say that a strategy s i is dominated givenR −i ⊆ R −i , whereR −i is non-empty, if s i is weakly dominated in the restriction (R i ,R −i , p 1 , . . ., p n ). Then we say that a strategy s i is inherently dominated if for every non-empty subsetR −i of R −i it is weakly dominated givenR −i .
This notion of dominance was introduced in Börgers [1990] , where its order independence was proved by establishing a connection between inherent dominance and rationalizability. In Börgers [1993] parts of Börgers [1990] were published, but not the proof of order independence. Denote by → I the corresponding reduction relation.
To prove that inherent dominance is hereditary suppose that R → I R ′ and that a strategy s i in R ′ is inherently dominated in R. 
Conclusions
We established here several order independence results. They were all proved by just checking a single property of the dominance relation, namely hereditarity. This approach works because of a combination of factors. First, as in Apt [2004] , we used abstract reduction systems. This allowed us to decouple one part of the argument from the study of the actual dominance relations.
Second, we viewed the dominance relations as unary relations, whereas the common approach in the literature is to view them as binary relations. Finally, we relied on the notion of hereditarity that is weaker than monotonicity. These changes allowed us to treat various forms of strict dominance and of being a never response, and inherent dominance in a uniform way.
We conclude by offering the following observation. It is clear how to define the intersection of dominance relations. The intersection of order independent dominance relations does not need to be order independent. On the other hand, the intersection of hereditary dominance relations is clearly hereditary. So our approach also allows us to draw conclusions about order independence of intersections of the discussed dominance relations. that b → * d and c → * d. Let n 3 be a normal form of d. It is also a normal form of b and of c. Moreover n 3 = n 1 or n 3 = n 2 . If n 3 = n 1 , then b is ambiguous and a → b. And if n 3 = n 2 , then c is ambiguous and a → c.
2
Clearly, order independence of a dominance relation D is equivalent to the statement that for all initial games G the reduction relation → D satisfies the unique normal form property on the set of all restrictions.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Consider a restriction R. Suppose that R → D R ′ for some restriction R ′ . Let R ′′ be the restriction of R obtained by removing all strategies that are D-dominated in R.
We have R ′′ ⊆ R ′ . Assume that R ′ = R ′′ . Choose an arbitrary strategy s i such that 
